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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the complex and often contentious relationship 
between constitutionalism and integralism in the Indonesian government and 
provides a criticism of democratization within the contemporary state. Integralist 
state portrays the relationship between the state and the people as analogous 
to a family, with the state as a father and the people as children (the Family 
Principle). Those that adhere to this view, with regard to contemporary Asian 
politics, claim that Asian values are inherently integralist, that Asia’s particular 
history and values different considerably from the West’s, and that Pancasila, 
Indonesia’s state philosophy, is utilized to establish romanticized relations between 
the ruler and the ruled. The data presented in this paper was collected from 
relevant articles on Indonesian democracy and Asian values. It also demonstrates 
how Pancasila, as Indonesia’s core guiding philosophy, has influenced debates 
over how the constitutional should be applied and interpreted. As the research 
shows, during the regimes of Sukarno and Suharto, Pancasila was manipulated in 
order to promote the goals of the state, and that a reliance on integralism during 
Indonesia’s founding years severely diminished human rights and Indonesia’s 
capacity for an efficient democracy. By continually putting the priorities of the 
state above those of the people, the Indonesian government has contradicted 
its adoption of human rights and liberal democracy is often challenged by the 
spirit of integralism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Over the last seven decades, Indonesia has experienced the slow establishment 
of democracy, from the birth of state in 1945, five decades of authoritarian 
regimes to the wave of democratic movements in the late 20th century. It is 
undeniable that such shifts in political regimes were the result of the severe 
policies of Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin) and Pancasila Democracy.1 
During the period when authoritarian regimes controlled the national economic 
and political interests,2 corruption was rampant and widespread throughout the 
bureaucracy, which eventually led to Indonesia suffering significantly during the 
Asian financial crisis.3 This condition led to unrest that resulted in what is now 
known as the Reformation (Reformasi). In particular, the Reformasi brought about 
a constitutional transformation with which made the Indonesian constitution 
more comprehensive and included the specified enumeration of citizen’s rights 
and the limitation of the powers of tripartite constitutional bodies.4
One of the major forces behind the Reformasi was the adoption of a so-called 
“illiberal democracy.” In the words of Fareed Zakaria, an illiberal democracy is a 
governmental system opposed to liberal democratic principles as commonly held 
in the West, but which is nonetheless a democracy marked by democratic election, 
the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the protection of property rights 
and the right to freedom of speech and assembly.5 In the Indonesian context, 
the concept of an illiberal democracy has been proffered as a means by which to 
1 The adoption of Guided Democracy was followed by chaotic situations, such as the rebellion against the central 
government, of them were affiliated to Masyumi Party. Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, 
Economy, Society, Transition (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 42. Such rebellion, however, was strongly motivated 
by the dissatisfaction of authoritarian style of government practiced by Sukarno. Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, 
Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 78.
2 Jayati Ghosh, “Coercive Corporatism: The State in Indonesian Capitalism,” Social Scientist 24, no. 11/12 (November 
1996): 37, https://doi.org/10.2307/3520101.
3 Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders, Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 54.
4 Adnan Buyung Nasution, “Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia” in Adnan Buyung Nasution Papers on 
Southeast Asian Constitutionalism. (Southeast Asian Constitutionalism, Melbourne: Asian Law Centre, Melbourne 
Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2011), 35.
5 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, 1997, 22.
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preserve and include with certain local or indigenous values,6 while still affirming 
the principles of democracy. It is often asserted that any Indonesian system of 
democracy must conform to Pancasila, (literally “The Five Principles”; the basic 
guiding principles of the Indonesian state) as it is claimed that Pancasila embodies 
the heart of Indonesian character and philosophy. Among the principles espoused 
by Pancasila is avoidance of contest or struggle between the ruling government 
and opposition,7 for the sake of establishing and maintaining a strong state in 
the spirit of gotong-royong (mutual help).8 However, as one might expect, such 
a principle can easily be an interpretation as a justification of integralism in all 
aspects of the relationship between the state and society.9
In a broader context, such an interpretation of Pancasila’s principles through 
and the integralist lens is in keeping with similar historically “Asian” values. These 
values draw from Asia’s long-held reliance on paternalistic relationships and 
respect for strong authority figures who try to rule in a manner reminiscent of 
the romanticized ideal family structure. Singapore, for instance, justifies “Asian” 
values as the main reason for the adoption of culturally relativistic stance, and 
argues that Asian cultures have backgrounds which are distinctly different from 
the West, which includes cultural precedence for the exemption from the adoption 
of universal human rights.10 As interpretation matters, Indonesia’s constitutional 
practices reflected cooperation among the various constitutionally created bodies, 
specifically between the administrative and representative branches. However, 
in the absence of constitutional limitations on the President’s tenure,11 and the 
6 It is extensively extracted from Supomo’s integralist idea. As one of the influential members of the Investigatory 
Committee for the Effort for the Preparation of the Independence of Indonesia (BPUPKI), he argued that there 
was no required the separation between people and government as if it is rooted from the Javanese mystical 
belief of manunggal kawula gusti (the unity of people and God). This term is frequently justified as being essential 
in Javanese philosophy which puts the unity of man and God, following the unity of the ruled and ruler. David 
Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3.
7 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1300 to the Present (London: Macmillan Education UK, 
1981), 239, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16645-9.
8 Eka Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society: A Cultural and Ethical 
Analysis (Leiden: BRILL, 1988), 181.
9 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 2.
10 Michael D. Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate,” Asian Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2000): 309.
11 The absence of the limitation of president’s tenure, however, took Sukarno and Suharto to assume the power up 
to 23 and 32 years respectively. Therefore, the constitutional amendment responded it as mentioned in Article 
7 by emanating the restriction with two terms of presidential tenure. Tim Lindsey, “Indonesian Constitutional 
Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy,” Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 6 (2002): 249.
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dependence of the President’s power on the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permisyawaratan Rakyat or MPR),12 compromises were made regarding the 
extent to which the Indonesian government could fully implement an integralist 
model in order for Suharto to cement his power.13
This paper seeks to revisit the relationship between constitutionalism and 
integralism within the Indonesian state, and in particular as it relates to Indonesia’s 
previous authoritarian regimes. To this end, the paper will also examine how 
Pancasila has been utilized and interpreted to serve as an ideological tool by the 
Indonesian government. While sacred Pancasila had been introduced along with 
Pancasila Democracy, it took Suharto to enjoy Indonesia’s longest presidential 
tenure. As this paper will argue, it is important to understand Pancasila as it is 
understood in contemporary Indonesia has been manipulated as a tool of the 
government to build and strengthen an authoritarian regime.
1.2. Research Questions
This paper will focus on three main questions. First, it will enquire as to 
the extent that constitutionalism, specifically regarding Pancasila, is the state’s 
sole ideology. Second, it will explore the relationship between Indonesian 
democracy and Asian values related to family principle. Third, it will examine 
the possibility of the reemergence of authoritarianism the post-Reformation era. 
It primarily concerns Prabowo’s proposal to the reinstate the original version 
of 1945 Constitution during the 2014 Presidential campaign and his opponent’s 
response in issuing regulations on Indonesian civil society organizations.
1.3. Research Method
The information presented in this paper was collected from relevant articles 
on Indonesian democracy and Asian values. The data has been compiled to 
examine how Pancasila has been contested and utilized to interpret, and affect 
alterations to the Indonesian constitution, and how integralism affects debate 
over the role of the constitution.
12 Adnan Buyung Nasution, “Relasi Kekuasaan Legislatif Dan Presiden Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945: Sistem Semi 
Presidensial Dalam Proyeksi,” Jurnal Hukum IUS QUIA IUSTUM 12, no. 28 (2005): 3.
13  Denny Indrayana, Negara Antara Ada Dan Tiada: Reformasi Hukum Ketatanegaraan (Jakarta: Kompas, 2008), 17.
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II. DISCUSSION
2.1. Integralist State: A Historical Overview
Integralism attitudes can be traced back to the very beginning of the modern 
Indonesian state. During the forum which resulted in the drafting of the 1945 
Constitution (known as the BPUPKI), there was a serious debate as to what political 
philosophy would prevail: integralism, authoritarianism, liberal democratic values, 
or Islamic teaching.14 Supporters of an integralist state demanded that Indonesia 
develop a strong state by uniting the nation and people as one organic entity. 
These integralists argued that a strong state would result from leadership by 
a charismatic ruler who incorporated an understanding of indigenous culture 
and historical experiences into the government.15 Supomo, one of the dominant 
figures during the BPUPKI, introduced this idea by proposing that Indonesia’s 
government structure needed to conform to the ancient Indonesian society, and 
stressed the importance of unified people and government.16 In other words, 
the government structure should embody family principles and mirror the 
familial relationship of the son and the father.17 However, this ‘unification’ of the 
government and people in a manner resembling a family implies the absence of 
certain basic rights, specifically political rights.
These ideas were immediately challenged by some other members of the 
forum. Maria Ulfah Santoso, a member of BPUPKI strongly protested against 
the absence of citizen’s rights in the initial drafts of the constitution.18 However, 
Supomo dismissed her complaint on the grounds that the Indonesian notion 
of popular sovereignty (kedaulatan rakyat) viewed the government as the 
manifestation of popular democracy.19
These contentious viewpoints resulted two major divisions during the drafting 
of Indonesia’s first constitution; the Supomo-Sukarno side which supported 
14 Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis (Portland: Bloomsbury Publish-
ing, 2012), 4.
15 Butt and Lindsey, 4.
16 Butt and Lindsey, 4.
17 Butt and Lindsey, 4.
18 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 75.
19 Bourchier, 75.
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integralist thoughts and the Hatta-Yamin side espoused social democratic ideals. 
The Hatta-Yamin faction advocated the need for the adoption of human rights 
as a means to oblige the government to take responsibility for its people and 
to protect against authoritarianism regimes in the future.20 They proposed that 
three fundamental rights which were included in the constitution are the right 
to express opinion, the right to organize and the right to free association.21 
Opposition to this, Supomo-Sukarno argued against the entire concept of human 
rights.22 Hatta, in a final defense, stated that though it was important to create 
unity, it should not be created at the expense of the citizen’s right to express 
themselves and to form organizations.23
Indonesia’s constitution is the world’s second shortest constitution, containing 
only 37 articles and this may be a result of the fact that there was little discussion 
on the adoption of human rights articles. Sukarno discredited human rights and 
alleged them to be the source of catastrophe during Indonesia’s colonial period.24 
In rejecting human rights articles, he argued in favor of a so-called Greater East 
Asian ideology.25 This ideology is based on Confucianism, and can be a witness 
in the political philosophy adopted by Singapore, which has led to a de facto 
single-party system which stresses communalism over individualism and which 
essentially generated a dictatorship, contrary to the very meaning of democracy.26
This rejection of human rights allowed authoritarianism to flourish in 
through the Old Order’s chaotic policy of Guided Democracy, which integrated 
the power of the President with the state itself.27 It inherently imitated the style 
of patrimonial politics in practice during the era of the pre-colonial Javanese 
monarchs.28 This can be seen through the issuance of a Presidential Decree on 
20 David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 2014), 240.
21 Bourchier and Hadiz, 240.
22 Ibid.
23 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 76.
24 Bourchier, 76.
25 Ibid.
26 Damien Kingsbury and Leena Avonius, eds., Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate, 
1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 7.
27 Butt and Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia, 7.
28 Harold Crouch, “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia,” World Politics 31, no. 4 (July 1979): 573, https://
doi.org/10.2307/2009910. 
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5 July 1959, a response to the drawn-out constitutional drafting process under 
Indonesia’s first legitimate constitutional drafting organization, Konstituante.29 
This presidential decree accommodated the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution, 
which had originally been intended only as an interim constitution.30
It is essential to note the reasons for Sukarno’s reinstatement of the 1945 
Constitution. First, it was argued at the time that Indonesia was experiencing a 
compelling situation which required reinstatement as the only solution.31 Second, 
Sukarno was trying to emphasize the greater symbolic meaning inherent within the 
1945 Constitution.32 By claiming that the 1945 Constitution was the manifestation 
of national ideology, Sukarno argued that reinstatement would once again 
unite all the people of Indonesia.33 Third, he believed that reinstatement would 
bring about an effective government.34 Moreover, finally, that reinstatement was 
a legitimate possibility under the prevailing Indonesian constitutional order.35
As a consequence, Sukarno was able to establish a life-long presidency, which, 
necessarily, severely threatened democracy’s future in Indonesia. As far as this 
article is concerned, the concept espoused by Supomo that the president is the 
manifestation of popular democracy rendered the very essence of democracy 
under threat of uncontrolled executive powers. The issuance of this presidential 
decree indicated the monopoly on the power of constitutional alteration held 
by the president at that time. However, from an administrative context, it was 
understood that the President did not have any power to create or change the 
constitution.
After Sukarno’s removal, the Suharto administration utilized integralist 
concepts in establishing and strengthening a new authoritarian order. Suharto 
29 Adnan Buyung Nasution, Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal Atas Konstituante 
1956-1959, 1995, 352.
30 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan 1999-2002, Buku X: Perubahan 
UUD, Aturan Peralihan dan Aturan Tambahan (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan MK, 2010), 10, 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/infoumum/naskahkomprehensif/pdf/naskah_Naskah%20
Komprehensif%20Buku%2010.pdf.
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is so-called ‘New Order,’ which was supported by the military, silenced political 
oppositions through a series of killings and politically motivated detentions 
from 1965 to 1966.36 In addition, it introduced ‘Pancasila Democracy’ the sole 
interpretation of Pancasila, and it introduced a two-week indoctrination program 
for civil servants, called P4 Courses (Upgrading Course on the Directives for the 
Realization and Implementation of Pancasila).37 Within this environment, an 
integralism was infused into the prevailing political and legal ideologies of the 
state as a means of promoting the principle of national unity.38
2.2. Illiberal Democracy and Asian Values: A History of Integralism in 
Indonesia
Indonesia’s adopting the principles of illiberal democracy is a result of the 
practices and policies of periods under Sukarno and Suharto. By ruling form 
a cultural relativist perspective, these two leaders, and their administrations, 
created a national identity based around Pancasila as derivative of indigenous 
values.39 Pancasila, therefore, became an expansionary paradigm amidst a period of 
international ideological conflict. Pancasila was gradually used as a tool through 
which to assert and affirm the validity of democracy practiced through a lens 
of Indonesian familial values, a tool that could be used to limit the western-
democratic movement. In other words, democracy was morphed to conform to 
Asian values by stressing the people’s reliance on the strength of Indonesian 
tradition and culture.40 
Supomo claimed that the appropriate model for Indonesia was one which 
was the derivative of indigenous values to the Indonesian archipelago. However, 
such a view requires further clarification: in practice it conformed more to the 
values of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,41 rather than traditional Indonesian 
36 Butt and Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia, 7.
37 Michael Morfit, “Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” Asian Survey 
21, no. 8 (August 1981): 838, https://doi.org/10.2307/2643886.
38 Butt and Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia, 7.
39 Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journal of East Asian Studies 
11, no. 2 (2011): 312.
40 Surain Subramaniam, “The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy,” Asian Affairs: 
An American Review 27, no. 1 (January 2000): 25, https://doi.org/10.1080/00927670009598827.
41 Nasution, Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 14.
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values. The establishment of a strong central state, authoritarian in nature, was 
justified as a return to the Indonesian principles of communalism, cooperation, 
and family values.42 In this system, individuals are seen an important component 
of the family and, therefore, of the state, but a state still retains sole and 
absolute powers. This system promoted the establishment of a strong state with 
uncontrolled powers invested in the executive body which adversely impacts to 
the guarantee of personal political rights.43 However, referencing ‘family principles,’ 
such a system becomes much more suited to gaining widespread acceptance and 
support within many Asian countries, including Indonesia.
Ethnic diversity was used as justification in the push to promote democracy 
rooted in Asian values and was interpreted as part of Pancasila’s goal of 
strengthening the political system.44 Accordingly, the promotion of a multicultural 
society was an instrument argument in favor of granting the President with 
unlimited power during the introduction of Guided Democracy.
During the Suharto’s era, freedom of expression and association were 
significantly restricted, and political parties were merged as the way of suppressing 
the resistance.45 The New Order used Pancasila as the basic ideological weapon 
in order to one overarching national principle. Pancasila, being derived from 
Indonesia’ Asian values that reflect the social awareness and togetherness, was 
the perfect vehicle for promoting a regime like the New Order which stressed the 
government’s oversight to society as a means to strengthen the leader’s hegemony. 
In the name of promoting economic development, Suharto’s authoritarianism 
was legitimated through its guarantee of social and economic prosperity for all.46
Relatively stable progress and welfare drove the continuation of the New 
Order dictatorship and price stability became the primary tool. To this end, 
Pancasila was used by the New Order’s to remind the populace that its policies 
42 Nasution, 14.
43 Richard Robison, “The Politics of ?Asian Values?,” The Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (January 1996): 310–11, https://
doi.org/10.1080/09512749608719189.
44 Harold Crouch, “Democratic Prospects in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (December 1993): 
82, https://doi.org/10.1080/02185379308434026.
45 Ariel Heryanto and Vedi R. Hadiz, “Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Comparative Southeast Asian Perspective,” 
Critical Asian Studies 37, no. 2 (January 2005): 267, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710500106341.
46 Robison, “The Politics Of ?,” 316.
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were in keeping with the spirit of Pancasila. Therefore, it was considered as a 
tool to advance the political society and an indicator that Indonesian democracy 
was working.
The creation of a strong centralized government fostered the existence of the 
New Order era dictatorship. The central government was without transparency 
and was not held accountable for the corruption which was rife at all levels of 
government.47 Economic growth was exploited to generate a personal wealth, rather 
than to achieve social and economic prosperity. Democracy was hijacked by the 
interests of the integralist state, a complete abuse of the liberal democratic system. 
However, due to this widespread corruption and the ensuing economic crisis, 
the conflict between political interests and the congestion of the political system 
brought about the New Order regime’s destruction.48 Due to the government 
reserving business opportunities only for family, friends, and fellow cronies, 
Indonesia experienced a weak economic system following the economic collapse 
of the 1998 Asian financial crisis.49 Student-initiated demonstrations brought to 
light the lies of the government and manner by which it had hijacked Asian 
values for its own gain. This led to the fall of the Suharto regime, otherwise 
known as the Reformation. 
However, the application Pancasila based democracy which conformed to 
Asian values for 32 years shares similarities with the Singapore’s application and 
adoption of said Asian values as a major component of its governing philosophy. 
In terms of the leadership, both have adhered to the concept of cultural relativism 
concerning the introduction of a democratic idea from the West.50 In Singapore, 
Asian values were promoted by Lee Kuan Yew as the moral values which should 
influence the development of the state, and claimed that individuals are naturally 
47 Philip Eldridge, “Human Rights in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. 1 (2002): 
129–30.
48 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia: Political Drift and State Decay,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. 1 
(2002): 25.
49 Louay Abdulbaki, “Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation,” Asian Journal of Political 
Science 16, no. 2 (August 2008): 158, https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370802204099.
50 Chang Yau Hoon, “Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity,” The 
Indonesian Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2004): 155, https://works.bepress.com/changyau_hoon/4/download/.
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on each other and therefore a parental state was justifiable.51 The leadership in 
Singapore has claimed that economic growth is the result of authoritarianism 
modeled on Asian values. These values, it is argued, encourage a balance of the 
state’s political branches. They are also claimed to have brought about Singapore’s 
success in good governance rankings and as the reason behind Singapore’s 
reputation Asia’s most transparent country.52 Singapore which is arguable the 
most developed country in Southeast Asia, relies on Asian values, whereas the 
majority of the developed world is oriented around democracy thought. 
Asian values have helped Singapore become a developed country with 
significant, economic growth and, socio-political harmony. Singapore is not 
obsessed with personal freedoms which occupy much of modern democratic 
ideology. However, though Singapore and Indonesia have established authoritarian 
governing systems based on these Asian values, it should be noted that there 
are some differences between them. Lee’s authoritarianism has resulted in a 
prosperous country with little obvious corruption. Suharto’s Pancasila Democracy, 
on the other hand, eschewed economic progress in favor of authoritarianism 
with little regard for the people’s welfare.53
It is important to clarify that, since the 1998 collapse, Indonesia has 
constructed a democracy which is much more in accordance with the western 
notion of democracy, including the adoption of separation of powers, human rights 
protections, and checks and balances among the branches of the government. 
According to western democratic principles, separation of powers is necessary in 
order to too much power not being invested in one government entity. The power 
of the executive is strictly limited so that it cannot control other institutions 
and it can be controlled to some degree by other branches of government such 
as the House and the Courts.54
51 Michael D. Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate,” Asian Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2000): 310.
52 Heryanto and Hadiz, “Post-Authoritarian Indonesia,” 256.
53 Mark R Thompson, “Pacific Asia After Asian Values: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Good Governance,” Third 
World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (September 2004): 1084, https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000256904.
54 Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Daniel Ura, “Public Opinion and Conflict in the Separation of Powers: 
Understanding the Honduran Coup of 2009,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 25, no. 1 (January 2013): 114, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0951629812453216.
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Conversely, the absence of such restrictions on power leads to authoritarianism, 
as is clear given the examples of the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. The ideological 
justifications for Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s Pancasila Democracy 
threatened the very nature of democracy and personal rights in Indonesia.55 The 
examples of these two regimes make it clear power without adequate control 
mechanism is a threat to democracy and the establishment of democratic society 
within Indonesia.
By examining the emergence of authoritarianism as practiced in the periods of 
Sukarno and Suharto, it is clear that integralism, as a model for the development 
of the state, should be evaluated and reconsidered; including the purported 
equation to Asian values. It should be clear that the rejection of human rights 
in order to promote economic growth and infrastructure development cannot 
be sustained in a democracy, but only in an autocracy. 
2.3. Democracy After Two Decades of Reformation: A Struggle towards 
Liberal Democracy
After the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, democracy in Indonesia 
emerged through a series of constitutional amendments which took place from 
1999 to 2002. As part of reformation agenda, these amendments were driven by 
constitutionalist principles an attempt to make constitutionalism the prevailing 
doctrine in Indonesia, something which the 1945 Constitution failed to offer, 
leading to generations of suffering by Indonesian citizens. These amendments 
reasserted the national commitment towards promoting a working of democracy, 
through the scope of the changes were limited by the constitution itself 
(constitutional democracy).
The Reformation can be best described as the resurgence of democracy 
after decades of authoritarianism justified by the need to protect and defend 
the national values enshrined in Pancasila. Accordingly, the Reformation, as 
a backlash against consecutive authoritarian regimes, sought to ensure that 
55 Mark R. Thompson, “Whatever Happened to Asian Values?,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 4 (2001): 156, https://
doi.org/10.1353/jod.2001.0083.
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government institutions fulfill the duties reserved to them by the constitution 
and that none of them exceed the powers given to them.
One of the most interesting inclusions in the amendment to the Indonesian 
constitution during the Reformation was the enumeration of powers and rights 
granted to the government. This was, as Denny argues, the most substantial 
aspect of constitutional limitation of state power taken in order to protect basic 
human rights.56 Therefore, in lieu of human rights violations which had occurred 
in the past, it was determined that the process of constitutional examination 
was required, and that the court should possess some power of judicial review 
regarding matters of constitutional disputes.
It is also important to note that freedom of the press has increased since the 
fall of Suharto. The transitional administration of President Habibie paved the 
way for this greater freedom by ensuring that the press was allowed to operate 
without fear and free of government surveillance. In addition, the first democratic 
election after the Reformation was conducted in 1999, with Abdurrahman Wahid 
winning the election. This election was followed by the presidency of Yudhoyono 
in 2004. However, Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached due to conflicts between 
his administration and the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat).
There are two important lessons from Indonesia’s early elections after the 
Reformation. First, Indonesia had successfully introduced the Constitutional Court 
and granted it the power to legally remove a sitting president, and the powers 
to conduct constitutional litigation, disband political parties, settle disputes 
between branches of government, and settle disputes regarding electoral results. 
Second, direct elections which replaced presidential appointment by parliament, 
positively impacted political stability in Indonesia. This shift has successfully 
generated a series of smooth successions from the president to the president 
since the beginning of the Reformation, which has resulted in more political 
stability. In other words, the changes to the electoral framework have altered the 
political symbiosis between the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the 
President that the office of the President is no longer subject to the Assembly. 
56 Denny Indrayana, Amandemen UUD 1945: Antara Mitos dan Pembongkaran (Mizan Pustaka, 2007), 124.
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Since the Reformation, democracy has flourished following the human rights 
guarantees outlined in the constitution. This is an indicator of the success of the 
Reformation and of the constitutionalist ideas which inspired it. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that an economic boom followed the success of the political 
transition of the Reformation, which has spurred rapid economic development in 
Indonesia. For instance, during the Yudhoyono era, the fragile economy recovering 
in the wake of the economic collapse of 1998 was transformed and quickly 
rebounded due to effective economic policies as the result of political stability.57 
During the Jokowi presidency, Indonesia’s economic performance similarly 
improved, as made evident by the implementation of a large infrastructure 
program. Through a series of infrastructure projects, Jokowi laid the groundwork 
for rapid economic development in the near future.58 Irrespective of political 
stability influencing economic growth as the result of Reformation, there are some 
critical notes on the future of Indonesian democracy. It is exemplified by the 
idea to reinstate the 1945 Constitution and the regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) 
to disband civil society organizations (CSOs). Regarding the idea of reverting 
to the original version of the 1945 Constitution, it was frequently reiterated by 
Prabowo Subianto, the presidential candidate from Gerindra Party.59 He argued 
that the current issues faced by Indonesia’s democratic system be a result of liberal 
democracy. In other words, the principles of liberal democracy which prevailed 
after the Reformation contradict the ideas or the spirit of Indonesian people, 
as outlined in the original constitution. Therefore, return to that document, as 
he argued, would be a means by which to steer Indonesia in a right direction.60
Prabowo’s political views are often considered outdated; counter to the spirit 
of the Reformation. The re-adoption of the original version of the constitution 
is unlikely to result in a strengthening of the democratic process, as can be 
surmised given the tumultuous experiences of the Sukarno and Suharto eras. 
57 The Jakarta Post, “The SBY Years: A Legacy of Lackluster Economy,” The Jakarta Post, accessed August 5, 2017, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/29/the-sby-years-a-legacy-lackluster-economy.html.
58 The Jakarta Post, “Infrastructure Development on Track: Jokowi - Business - The Jakarta Post,” accessed August 
5, 2017, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/03/infrastructure-development-on-track-jokowi.html.
59 Edward Aspinall, “Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy,” Indonesia 99, 
no. 1 (2015): 19.
60 Ibid, 19.
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Modern Indonesian society would surely be harmed by such a regression, as 
the democratization process was begun as a means of reforming political and 
constitutional ideas to bring a democratic state and society which had been 
lacking under the original constitution. Still, the re-adoption remains a possibility, 
especially if it is supported by MPR, the only entity with the power to amend 
and change the constitution.
Additionally, though the rhetoric espoused publicly by Prabowo is inherently 
nationalistic, his activities show that he is also a pragmatic capitalist. He 
championed nationalism while simultaneously contributing to Indonesia’s poor 
economic welfare of the support of economic exploitation by foreign powers.61 He 
also suggests that strong and charismatic executive leadership of the archipelago is 
needed to counteract the weak bureaucracy which easily succumbs to corruption.62 
Prabowo’s political rhetoric is an indicator that though Indonesia has experienced 
a Reformation, the spirit of authoritarianism has remained.
Though opposed to Prabowo’s desire for a return to the original constitution, 
the Jokowi administration, has made some recent political blunders too, 
most notably the issuance of Perppu No. 2/2017 that legalizes authoritarian 
administration to disband CSOs. This law essentially lays the groundwork for 
more easily silencing CSOs by shifting the authority to disband CSO from the 
court’s process to the executive. The creation of this law is understood to be an 
effort to silence one CSO in particular the radical religious group Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI). However, it threatens the existence of all CSOs, as according 
to Perppu, if the case can be made that a CSO’s activities are counter to the 
principles of Pancasila, it can be unilaterally disbanded by the executive.
Therefore, the safety of CSOs in Indonesian is now related to the manner 
in which Pancasila is interpreted and defined. This then begs the question as to 
whether Pancasila can possess any interpretations besides that which is approved 
by the government. Furthermore, the questions as to whether the government 
should even be afforded the power to interpret Pancasila should be examined 
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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and given considerable weight. Concerning this issue, it should be observed that 
the creation of Perppu sets the precedence of the executive branch possessing a 
monopoly on administrative powers over other constitutional created bodies such 
as the House. Through the adoption of Perppu, the President has effectively seized 
power to draft and enact laws, a power formerly the prerogative of the House 
of Representative, and the power to interpret the law during CSO disbandment 
cases, a power that was previously reserved for the Court. In short, through the 
creation of Perppu, the President has exercised an overreach of power.
The absence of criteria which outline an “emergency situation” have 
contributed to the President’s overreach through the issuance of Perppu. Article 
22 of the 1945 Constitution, which deals with the emergency powers of the 
executive, grants the President the legitimate constitutional power to issue 
laws like Perppu, but it does not specify any parameters regarding when these 
emergency powers should be enacted. In other words, it does not define what 
is considered an emergency situation and leaves this issue to the Presidents 
discretion. 
III. CONCLUSION
The state of democracy of Indonesia in the post-reformation era is moving in 
the right direction. By adopting the limited principles outlined by the constitution, 
the Indonesian government is improving the separation of powers and working 
to guarantee human rights provisions, as stipulated in the constitution. However, 
recent developments show that this trend towards democratic principles is 
potentially being derailed in an authoritarian direction. This regression may be 
the result of the continued influence of cultural relativism.
Ironically, the effects of cultural relativism influenced Indonesia’s shift towards 
liberal democracy during the 1998 Asian financial crisis. In the decades since the 
recovery, however, the struggle to implement democratic principles has given rise 
questions as to whether or not Indonesia has truly adopted and accepted liberal 
democracy. In fact, the modern Indonesian state was challenged by Prabowo, as a 
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result of his emphasis on returning to the original texts of the 1945 Constitution 
could be better described as a so-called “illiberal democracy.” Unfortunately, 
the administration of Joko Widodo seems to have made a political blunder in 
issuing Perppu. As a result of the monopoly of power which Perppu grants to the 
executive, it poses a threat to freedom of expression and the right to association, 
those freedoms which Hatta and Yamin were concerned about when proposing the 
human rights provisions in the early drafts of the 1945 Constitution. In an effort 
to stem this tide of authoritarianism, political changes, and even constitutional 
amendments should be enacted to ensure that Indonesia remains on the track 
towards democratization. Additionally, the extent of the powers granted to the 
President through Perppu needs to be clearly defined. This greater definition is 
required as a means to ensure that President may only utilize said powers in 
legal and appropriate situations and to avoid the ever-present threat of abuse 
of power which causes citizens’ rights to be trespassed upon. 
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